Pensions and Fertility Incentives

Robert Fenge and Volker Meier

No 879, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper discusses the efficiency of a pay-as-you-go pension reform by introducing a child benefit in an endogenous fertility setting. In the model of a small open economy, higher fertility is associated with a reduction of lifetime labor supply. The optimum share of fertility-related pensions is always below unity, but generally positive. The former is true since individuals do not take into account the impact of their labor supply choice on the parent generation. It is demonstrated that child allowances are equivalent to fertility-related pensions as instruments to achieve an efficient allocation.

Keywords: public pensions; pay-as-you-go; fertility; externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Pensions and fertility incentives (2005)
Journal Article: Pensions and fertility incentives (2005)
Working Paper: Pensions and Fertility Incentives (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_879

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