Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions

Marina Agranov, Ahrash Dianat, Larry Samuelson and Leeat Yariv

No 8820, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability; their combination drastically diminishes stability’s likelihood. Third, matchings form “from the top down” in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants’ market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.

Keywords: matching; incomplete information; stability; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8820.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8820

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().