On the Incentive Compatibility of Universal Adoption of Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation

Eric Bond and Thomas Gresik

No 8836, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze the incentives for an individual country to deviate from destination-based cash flow taxation (DBCFT) in a two-country model in which both countries have adopted DBCFT. A change in a country’s corporate tax rate, degree of taxation of capital income, and/or level of border adjustment generates welfare effects that can be decomposed into fiscal effects, a price level effect, and relative price effects. We establish that at least one country will have an incentive to deviate from universal DBCFT by reducing the deduction for capital investments, even with asymmetric countries. For the deviations involving reduction in border adjustments, we show that both countries will have an incentive to deviate in the symmetric case. Universal DBCFT will not be incentive compatible in a one-shot tax setting game, so commitment mechanisms will be required to sustain it as an equilibrium.

Keywords: destination-based taxes; source-based taxes; cash-flow taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H21 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-opm, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: On the incentive compatibility of universal adoption of destination-based cash flow taxation (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8836

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