Strategic Export Motives and Linking Emission Markets
Panos Hatzipanayotou and
No 8847, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We explore the possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome when governments act non-cooperatively in a strategic environmental policy model where emission permit markets are linked. We introduce a specific distribution scheme of the permit revenues between the exporting countries so as to sustain the cooperative outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Participation in the scheme is endogenized and we show that it constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as long as the countries are not too asymmetric. Our results are robust once we allow for multiple pollutants, different modes of competition and market power in the permits market.
Keywords: strategic environmental policy; internationally tradable permits; cross-border pollution; imperfect competition; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F18 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth, nep-int and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8847
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().