The Purity of Impure Public Goods

Anja Brumme, Wolfgang Buchholz () and Dirk Rübbelke

No 8852, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate how the impure public good model can be converted into a pure public good model with satiation of private consumption, which can be handled more easily, by using a variation of the aggregative game approach as devised by Cornes and Hartley (2007). We point out the conditions for impure public good utility functions that allow for this conversion through which the analysis of Nash equilibria can be conducted in a unified way for the impure and the pure public good model and which facilitates comparative statics analysis for impure public goods. Our approach also offers new insights on the determinants for becoming a contributor to the public good in the impure case as well as on the non-neutral effects of income transfers on Nash equilibria when the public good is impure.

Keywords: impure public goods; warm-glow giving; Nash equilibria; aggregative game approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: The purity of impure public goods (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8852

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