Ambiguous Protection

Klaus Gründler () and Arye Hillman ()

No 8888, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects are consistent with producerprotecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.

Keywords: protectionism; World Trade Organization; regulation; non-tariff barriers; public safety; environmental protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 L15 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Ambiguous protection (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8888

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