The Economics of Platform Liability
Yassine Lefouili and
Leonardo Madio ()
No 8919, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Public authorities in many jurisdictions are concerned about the proliferation of illegal content and products on online platforms. In this paper, we provide an economic appraisal of platform liability that highlights the effects of a stricter liability rule on several key variables such as prices, terms and conditions, business models, and investments. We also discuss the impact of the liability regime applying to online platforms on competition between them and the incentives of third parties relying on them. Finally, we analyze the potential costs and benefits of measures that have received much attention in recent policy discussions.
Keywords: liabilities rules; online platforms; illegal content and products; intellectual property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K42 L22 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8919
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