Does Envelopment through Data Advantage Call for New Regulation?

Gregor Langus and Vilen Lipatov

No 8932, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Envelopment is an effective form of market entry that facilitates competition among platforms. Nevertheless, many commentators have focused on the anticompetitive potential of envelopment, and some have argued for regulation of platforms because of that concern. These calls for regulation are not supported by robust formal analysis or comprehensive empirical evidence. We analyze a visible recent contribution by Condorelli and Padilla (2020a,b) and explain why the model that they put forward is not ripe for policy advice in relation to concerns with envelopment.

Keywords: envelopment; entry deterrence; data; competition of multi-market platforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8932

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