Motivation Crowding in Peer Effects: The Effect of Solar Subsidies on Green Power Purchases
Andrea La Nauze ()
No 8940, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
I test whether economic incentives dampen peer effects in public-good settings. I study how a visible and subsidized contribution to a public good (installing solar panels) affects peer contributions that are neither subsidized nor visible (electing green power). Exploiting spatial variation in the feasibility of installing solar panels, I find that panels increase voluntary purchases of green power by neighbors. However, using sharp changes in government incentives over time, I find that the magnitude of the spillover depends on the level of subsidies to solar. The results support the hypothesis that signals drive peer responses to visible public-good contributions and that economic incentives blur those signals.
Keywords: motivation; public goods contribution; solar panels; green energy; environmental public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-hme, nep-net and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8940
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