 The All-pay Auction with Complete InformationMichael Baye,
Dan Kovenock,
Casper De Vries and
de Vries Casper G
No 90, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Abstract: In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widelly used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races. political contests, and jo b promotion tournaments . We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players. for instance. we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover. for economically important configurations of valuations. there is not revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric Equilibrium. Date: 1995 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_90 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC. |
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