Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators

Lars Feld and Stefan Voigt

No 906, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians’ preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto JI focusing on countries’ actually experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP growth per capita growth, de facto JI positively influences it.

Keywords: economic growth; rule of law; judicial independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (214)

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Journal Article: Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_906

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