Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants under Asymmetric Information

Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel ()

No 919, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical explanation why it may be optimal for higher-level governments to pay categorical block grants or closed-ended matching grants to local governments. We consider a federation with two types of local governments which differ in the cost of providing public goods. The federal government redistributes between jurisdictions, but cannot observe the type of a jurisdiction. In this asymmetric information setting it is shown that the second-best optimum can be decentralized with the help of categorical block grants and closed-ended matching grants, but not with unconditional block grants or open-ended matching grants.

Keywords: asymmetric information; categorical block grants; closed-ended matching grants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants Under Asymmetric Information (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal design of intergovernmental grants under asymmetric information (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_919

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