Ethnofederalism and Ethnic Voting

Richard Bluhm, Roland Hodler and Paul Schaudt

No 9314, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We investigate how changes in the administrative-territorial structure affect ethnic voting. We present an event study design that exploits the 2010 constitutional reform in Kenya, which substantially increased the number of primary administrative regions. We find (i) strong evidence for a reduction in ethnic voting when administrative regions become less ethnically diverse and (ii) weak evidence for such a reduction when ethnic groups become less fragmented across regions. These results suggest that ‘ethnofederal’ reforms (leading to administrative borders that more closely follow ethnic boundaries) can mitigate ethnic politics in diverse countries.

Keywords: ethnofederalism; decentralization; territorial structure; ethnic divisions; ethnic voting; ethnic politics; Kenya (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 H77 J15 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9314

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