Competition and Mergers with Strategic Data Intermediaries

David Bounie, Antoine Dubus and Patrick Waelbroeck

No 9339, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition between firms, and by reducing the amount of consumer data collected. We argue that merger policy guidelines should investigate the effect of the data strategies of large intermediaries on competition and consumer surplus in related markets.

Keywords: data; mergers; competition; consumer surplus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9339

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