Willingness to Pay for Workplace Safety
Massimo Anelli () and
No 9469, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
This paper develops a revealed-preference approach that uses budget constrain discontinuities to price workplace safety. We track hourly workers who face the decision of how many hours to work at varying levels of Covid-19 risk and leverage state-specific discontinuities in unemployment insurance eligibility criteria to identify the labor supply behavior. Results show large baseline responses at the threshold and increasing responses for higher health risks. The observed behavior implies that workers are willing to accept 34% lower incomes to reduce the fatality rate by one standard deviation, or 1% of income for a one in a million chance of dying.
Keywords: hazard pay; workplace safety; non-wage amenities; partial unemployment insurance; Covid19; labor supply; value of life (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J17 J22 J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Willingness to Pay for Workplace Safety (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9469
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().