Extraterritorial Trade Sanctions: Theory and Application to the US-Iran-EU Conflict

Eckhard Janeba

No 9573, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Under extraterritorial sanctions the sanctioning country extends its policies to trade of third countries with the sanctioned country. A prominent example is former US President Trump’s decision to leave the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a multilateral agreement with Iran. The decision led to a shutdown of EU trade with Iran. In this paper, I develop a game-theoretic model to explain the emergence of extraterritorial sanctions. Such trade sanctions i) do not arise when the harmful activity of the sanctioned country (“build a nuclear bomb”) is verifiable even if monetary transfers are ruled out, but ii) emerge if a second activity (“sponsor international terrorism”) is not verifiable, and the sanctioning countries differ in their gains from trade with the sanctioned country, their harm from the non-verifiable, and their reputational cost from abandoning the international economic order. In the context of the US-Iran-EU conflict, I argue that the oil and gas fracking boom in the US together with former President Trump’s ignorance of his international reputation are key factors in the emergence of extraterritorial trade sanctions.

Keywords: international trade; sanctions; extraterritorial sanctions; US-Iran conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F51 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-int and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Extraterritorial trade sanctions: Theory and application to the US–Iran–EU conflict (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9573

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