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Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players

Marco Sahm

No 9601, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r ≥ 2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r

Keywords: Tullock contest; heterogeneous valuations; accuracy; discrimination; optimal design; all-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

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