The Effect of Losing and Winning on Cheating and Effort in Repeated Competitions
Sarah Necker () and
No 9744, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects compete with different types of opponents in the second round (random/based on first-round outcome). We find that (i) losing causes competitors to increase cheating in the second round while winning implies a tendency to reduce cheating. A similar effect is found with regard to effort, which losers increase to a larger extent than winners. (ii) Competitor matching does not significantly affect behavior.
Keywords: cheating; effort; competition; competitor; social recognition; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 J28 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lma and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9744
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