Private Information and Optimal Infant Industry Protection
Raymond Riezman () and
No 9772, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We study infant industry protection using a dynamic model in which the industry’s cost is initially higher than that of foreign competitors. The industry can stochastically lower its cost via learning by doing. Whether the industry has transitioned to low cost is private information. We use a mechanism-design approach to induce the industry to reveal its true cost. We show that (i) the optimal protection, measured by infant industry output, declines over time and is less than that under public information, (ii) the optimal protection policy is time consistent under public information but not under private information, (iii) the optimal protection policy can be implemented with minimal information requirements, and (iv) a government with a limited budget can use a simple approach to choose which industries to protect.
Keywords: protection; infant industry; private information; mechanism design; time consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F10 F13 O25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-dge
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Working Paper: Private Information and Optimal Infant Industry Protection (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9772
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