General Equilibrium and Dynamic Inconsistency
Kirill Borissov,
Mikhail Pakhnin and
Ron Wendner
No 9846, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
We study the role of expectations of naive agents in a general equilibrium version of the Ramsey model with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. When agents recognize others’ naivete, as strongly suggested by empirical evidence, they revise consumption paths, correctly anticipating prices in a resulting sliding equilibrium (perfect foresight). When agents are unaware of others’ naivete, as is typically assumed in the literature, they revise both consumption paths and price expectations (quasi-perfect foresight). We prove the existence of sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight for the class of isoelastic utility functions. We show that generically quasi-hyperbolic discounting matters for saving behavior: sliding equilibrium under perfect foresight is observationally equivalent to some optimal path in the standard Ramsey model if and only if utility is logarithmic. We compare sliding equilibria under different types of foresight and show that perfect foresight implies a higher saving rate, long-run capital stock, and consumption level than quasi-perfect foresight.
Keywords: quasi-hyperbolic discounting; time inconsistency; naivete; sliding equilibrium; perfect foresight; observational equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D15 D84 D91 E21 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp9846.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: General equilibrium and dynamic inconsistency (2024) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9846
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe (wohlrabe@ifo.de).