Viable Nash Equilibria: An Experiment

Duk Gyoo Kim, Daehong Min and John Wooders

No 9913, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures well how the viability of the everyone-participates (eP) equilibrium depends on the success threshold; the measure does not capture other elements of the game which affect the likelihood that the eP equilibrium is played.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; viability; laboratory experiments; coordination game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C00 C70 C92 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9913

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