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Recurrent Preemption Games

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CARF-F-472, CARF F-Series from Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Abstract: I consider a new model of an infinitely repeated preemption game with random matching, termed the recurrent preemption game, wherein each player’s discount factor depends on whether she wins the current game. This model describes sequential strategic technology adoptions in which a company becomes outdated by failing to maintain a position at the forefront of innovation. Assuming incomplete information about the presence of a rival, I clarify how the prominence of the innovator’s dilemma influences the degree of excessive competition in preemption. I also reveal interesting properties demonstrated by the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the recurrent preemption game.

Pages: 24
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020) Downloads
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