Recurrent Preemption Games

Hitoshi Matsushima

No 1020, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: I consider a new model of an infinitely repeated preemption game with random matching, termed the recurrent preemption game, wherein each player’s discount factor depends on whether she wins the current game. This model describes sequential strategic technology adoptions in which a company becomes outdated by failing to maintain a position at the forefront of innovation. Assuming incomplete information about the presence of a rival, I clarify how the prominence of the innovator’s dilemma influences the degree of excessive competition in preemption. I also reveal interesting properties demonstrated by the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the recurrent preemption game.

Keywords: Recurrent Preemption Game; Strategic Technology Adoption; Innovator’s Dilemma; Unique Equilibrium; Random Technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 L13 O30 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
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