Mediation and Peace

Johannes Horner, Massimo Morelli and Francesco Squintani ()
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Johannes Horner: Yale University
Massimo Morelli: European University Institute; Columbia University,

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: This paper applies mechanism design to con ict resolution. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of con ict in a game with asymmetric information. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of con ict is high, or when asymmetric information is signi cant. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to con icting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more e ective than mediators who only make non-binding recommendations.

Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear ... 7.2011_squintani.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2015)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2011)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cge:wacage:67

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