Mediation and Peace

Johannes Hoerner, Massimo Morelli () and Francesco Squintani ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Johannes Hörner

No ECO2011/19, Economics Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper applies mechanism design to conict resolution. We determine when and how unmediated communication and mediation reduce the ex ante probability of conflict in a game with asymmetric information. Mediation improves upon unmediated communication when the intensity of conict is high, or when asymmetric information is significant. The mediator improves upon unmediated communication by not precisely reporting information to conflicting parties, and precisely, by not revealing to a player with probability one that the opponent is weak. Arbitrators who can enforce settlements are no more effective than mediators who only make non-binding recommendations.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-cta
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/17578/ECO_2011_19.pdf?sequence=1 main text

Related works:
Journal Article: Mediation and Peace (2015)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2015)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2011)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
Working Paper: Mediation and Peace (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/19

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from European University Institute Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cécile Brière ().