Do Economic Warfare and Sanctions Work? Three Centuries of Evidence

Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison ()

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: We draw lessons from three centuries of economic warfare and sanctions. Establishing cause and effect is difficult because much else was typically changing during periods of conflict. Unintended consequences were everywhere. Impact was followed (and sometimes preceded) by adaptation so that countermeasures blunted the effectiveness of economic warfare measures and sanctions. This does not mean that the original measures were unimportant, because countermeasures were costly to the target country. Civilian lives and interests were collateral damage. Economic warfare and sanctions worked most effectively when complemented by fighting power either engaged in conventional warfare or credibly threatening war as a deterrent, and they were ineffective in its absence.

Keywords: complementary force; conventional warfare; displacement effect; economic warfare; economic sanctions JEL Classification: H56; N4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-int
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... tions/wp747.2025.pdf

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Working Paper: Do Economic Warfare and Sanctions Work? Three Centuries of Evidence (2025)
Working Paper: Do Economic Warfare and Sanctions Work? Three Centuries of Evidence (2025)
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