Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline

Amrita Dhillon (), Vegard Iversen and Gaute Torsvik
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Vegard Iversen: University of Manchester

CAGE Online Working Paper Series from Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)

Abstract: We study ex-post hiring risks in low income countries with limited legal and regulatory frameworks. In our theory of employee referral, the new recruit internalises the rewards and punishments of the in-house referee meted out by the hiring firm. This social mechanism makes it cheaper for the firm to induce worker discipline. The degree of internalization depends on the unobserved strength of the endogenous social tie between the referee and the recruit. When the referee's utility is increasing in the strength of ties, referee workplace incentives do not matter and referee and employer incentives are aligned, in this case industries and jobs with high costs of opportunism and where dense kinship networks can match the skill requirements of employers will have clusters of close family and friends, they will show a high incidence of referrals rather than anonymous hiring and will show a wage premium to referred workers matched by their higher productivity. This no longer applies if the referee's utility is decreasing in the strength of ties: referrals are then more costly for firms, they will be used less frequently by employers and will require higher referee wages (or status). We illustrate how these insights add to our understanding of South-Asian labour markets.

Keywords: Efficiency wage Contracts; Moral hazard; Referee incentives; Referrals; Networks; Strength of ties; Spot market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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