Equilibrium Consequences of Vouchers Under Simultaneous Extensive and Intensive Margins Competition

Cristián Sánchez

Working Papers Central Bank of Chile from Central Bank of Chile

Abstract: I develop an empirical model to study the consequences of educational vouchers on markets’ equilibria. Unlike most related papers, I model both extensive and intensive margins of action for schools. I apply my model to Chile’s primary education, an industry that heavily subsidizes private schools through the use of vouchers. Results show that a correct understanding of the equilibrium consequences of vouchers necessitates accounting for both extensive (program participation) and intensive (fees) margins. I also find that the actual voucher program targeted to vulnerable students attracts mostly low-quality schools to serve low-income families. Alternative policy designs are proposed and tested.

Date: 2025-03
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bcentral.cl/documents/33528/133326/Doc ... 96b0?t=1743002936368 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chb:bcchwp:1038

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers Central Bank of Chile from Central Bank of Chile Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alvaro Castillo ().