Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy

Martin Melecký, Diego Rodríguez Palenzuela and Ulf Söderström ()

Working Papers Central Bank of Chile from Central Bank of Chile

Abstract: We quantify the effects of monetary policy transparency and credibility on macroeconomic volatility in an estimated model of the Eurozone. In our model, private agents are unable to distinguish between temporary shocks to the central bank's monetary policy rule and persistent shifts in the inflation target, and therefore use optimal filtering techniques to construct estimates of the future monetary policy stance. We find that the macroeconomic benefits of credibly announcing the current level of the time-varying inflation target are reasonably small as long as private agents correctly understand the stochastic processes governing the inflation target and the temporary policy shock. If, on the other hand, private agents overestimate the volatility of the inflation target, the overall gains of announcing the target can be substantial. We also show that the central bank can, to some extent, help private agents in their learning process by responding more aggressively to deviations of inflation from the target.

Date: 2008-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Chapter: Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy (2009)
Working Paper: Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chb:bcchwp:490

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