The Rise of NGO Activism

Julien Daubanes () and Jean Rochet

No 17-40, Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series from Swiss Finance Institute

Abstract: WActivist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that were approved by public regulators. We develop a model that explains this phenomenon. We consider a potentially-harmful industrial project that is subject to regulatory approval. The regulator can be influenced by the industry, and may approve the project even though it is harmful. However, an NGO may oppose it. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and under which it is socially beneficial. The theory explains the role that NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the social legitimacy of NGO activism and the appropriate degree of transparency of industrial activities.

Keywords: NGO activism; Public regulation; Industry influence; Private politics; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65 pages
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Rise of NGO Activism (2019)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2019)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2016)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1740

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