The Rise of NGO Activism

Julien Daubanes () and Jean Rochet

No 2019.01, Working Papers from FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists

Abstract: Activist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) increasingly oppose firms’ practices. We suggest this might be related to the vulnerability of public regulation to corporate influence. We examine a potentially-harmful industrial project subject to regulatory approval. Under industry influence, the regulator may approve the project even though it is harmful. However, an NGO may oppose it. We characterize the circumstances under which NGO opposition occurs and under which it is socially beneficial. Our theory explains the role that NGOs have assumed in the last decades, and has implications for the social legitimacy of activism and the appropriate degree of transparency of industrial activities.

Keywords: NGO activism; Public regulation; Industry influence; Private politics; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 75 pages
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

Downloads: (external link)
http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Daubanes_Rochet_FAERE_WP2019.01.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Rise of NGO Activism (2019)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2017)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2016)
Working Paper: The Rise of NGO Activism (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fae:wpaper:2019.01

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