Go West Young Man: Self-selection and Endogenous Property Rights

Taylor Jaworski and Bart Wilson

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this paper we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. We find that the absence of property rights clearly decreases wealth in our environment and that interest in establishing property rights is a key determinant of the decision to migrate to a new region. Theft is nearly eliminated among migrants, resulting in strong growth, and non-migrants remain in poverty. Thus, self-selection, through the decision to migrate, to form more cooperative groups is essential for establishing property rights.

Keywords: experimental economics; property rights; migration and exit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D51 F10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Jaworski-Wilson_Gowestyoungman.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Go West Young Man: Self‐Selection and Endogenous Property Rights (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:09-02

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