Go West Young Man: Self‐Selection and Endogenous Property Rights

Taylor Jaworski and Bart Wilson

Southern Economic Journal, 2013, vol. 79, issue 4, 886-904

Abstract: If, as Hume argues, property is a self‐referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this article we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self‐selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. To test a hypothesis of Demsetz's, we vary across two treatments the external benefits of migrating. We find that self‐selection has a powerful effect on establishing conventions of property and begetting increases in wealth through exchange and specialization. We also find support for the Demsetz hypothesis.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2011.249

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Working Paper: Go West Young Man: Self-selection and Endogenous Property Rights (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:79:y:2013:i:4:p:886-904

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