Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games

Timothy Cason, Anya Savikhin () and Roman Sheremeta
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Anya Savikhin: The University of Chicago
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anya Savikhin Samek

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Keywords: coordination; order-statistic games; experiments; cooperation; minimum game; behavioral spillover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:09-06

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