Combinatorial Clock Auctions: Price Direction and Performance

David Munro and Stephen Rassenti

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This paper addresses three concerns with ascending price Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs); price guidance toward efficiency relevant packages, computational burden, and susceptibility to collusive bidding. We propose a descending price Combinatorial Clock Auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to alleviate all of these concerns. Mimicking bidding behavior of human subjects found in previous laboratory experiments, agent-based simulations of DCCA show improvements in efficiency resulting from better price guidance and a reduction in computational burden when compared to a CCA. In addition, we summarize evidence from previous literature that highlights the collusion resistance of descending price institutions.

Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2011
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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ialClockAuctions.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-19

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