Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance

David Munro and Stephen Rassenti

Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 117, issue C, 195-217

Abstract: The lack of price guidance towards efficiency relevant packages in ascending combinatorial clock auctions (ACCA) can lead to a low-efficiency allocation of goods. We propose a descending price combinatorial clock auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to improve on this problem. Using agent-based simulations we document that the DCCA provides significant improvements over the ACCA and we are able to understand in which environments these improvements are likely to be the strongest. We test these predictions in the laboratory with human subjects and find evidence that the DCCA generates improvements in auction efficiency and revenue.

Keywords: Combinatorial auctions; Efficiency; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Combinatorial Clock Auctions: Price Direction and Performance (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:195-217

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.001

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