EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: An Experiment

Mikhail Drugov (), Roberto Hernán-González (), Praveen Kujal () and Marta Troya Martinez ()
Additional contact information
Roberto Hernán-González: Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Granada

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roberto Hernán González ()

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: In this paper we experimentally test strategic information transmission between one informed and two uninformed agents in a cheap-talk game. We find evidence of the "disciplining" effect of public communication as compared to private; however, it is much weaker than predicted by the theory. Adding a second receiver naturally increases the complexity of strategic thinking when communication is public. Using the level-k model, we exploit the within subject design to show how individuals decrease their level-k in public communication. Surprisingly, we find that individuals become more sophisticated when they communicate privately with two receivers rather than one.

Keywords: Cheap Talk; Communication; Experiment; Level-k; Cognitive ability; Cognitive Reflection Test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... es-an-experiment.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-32

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().

 
Page updated 2020-09-29
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-32