The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson ()
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Brian Roberson: Purdue University, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender's objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker's objective is to destroy a set of nodes that disconnects the network. The con ict at each node is modeled as a contest in which the player that allocates the higher level of force wins the node. Although there are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the players' multivariate joint distributions of force across nodes that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic `guerrilla warfare' strategy in which a single random [minimal] set of nodes that disconnects the network is attacked.

Keywords: Allocation Game; Asymmetric Con ict; Attack and Defense; Colonel Blotto Game; Network Connectivity; Weakest-Link; Best-Shot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... ork-Connectivity.pdf

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Working Paper: The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-24

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