The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

No 5653, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender’s objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker’s objective is to destroy a set of nodes that disconnects the network. The conflict at each node is modeled as a contest in which the player that allocates the higher level of force wins the node. Although there are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the players’ multivariate joint distributions of force across nodes that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random [minimal] set of nodes that disconnects the network is attacked.

Keywords: allocation game; asymmetric conflict; attack and defense; Colonel Blotto Game; network connectivity; weakest-link; best-shot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity (2015)
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