Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

Keywords: coordination; information; equilibrium selection; conventions; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.chapman.edu/research/institutes-and-ce ... ers/burnham-2017.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games (2018)
Working Paper: Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-12

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