Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Gabriele Camera and Marco Casari

Experimental Economics, 2018, vol. 21, issue 3, No 10, 673-691

Abstract: Abstract Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

Keywords: Coordination; Information; Equilibrium selection; Conventions; Social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games (2017)
Working Paper: Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9532-5

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