The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson ()
Additional contact information
Brian Roberson: Purdue University, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: An earlier version of this paper appeared as Purdue working paper no. 1251, August 2010. We have benefited from the helpful comments of Kai Konrad and Daniel G. Arce as well as participants in conferences and seminars at Chapman University, North Carolina State University, Purdue University, Southern Methodist University, Stockholm School of Economics, Technical University of Dortmund, UC Irvine, University of Cambridge, University of East Anglia, University of Missouri, University of Pittsburgh, and University of Zurich. Part of this work was completed while Kovenock was Visiting Professor at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB). Roberson gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), the Miami University Committee on Faculty Research, and the Farmer School of Business. The authors, of course, remain solely responsible for any errors or omissions

Keywords: Allocation Game; Asymmetric Conflict; Attack and Defense; Colonel Blotto Game; Weakest-Link (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.chapman.edu/research/institutes-and-ce ... of-Networks-2017.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: THE OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF NETWORKS OF TARGETS (2018)
Working Paper: The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-18

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Megan Luetje ().