The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets

Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. In this context, our results highlight the importance of modeling asymmetric attack and defense as a conflict between fully strategic actors with endogenous entry and force expenditure decisions as well as allowing for general correlation structures for force expenditures within and across the networks of targets.

Keywords: Asymmetric Conflict; Attack and Defense; Weakest-Link; Best-Shot (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

Downloads: (external link)
https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2010/1251.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: THE OPTIMAL DEFENSE OF NETWORKS OF TARGETS (2018)
Working Paper: The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1251

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business PHD ().