The Attack and Defense Games

Roman Sheremeta

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.

Keywords: contest; experiment; attack; defense (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Attack and Defense Games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-17

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