Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence and Characterization

Gabriele Camera and Alessandro Gioffré

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory so cieties rely on inde?nitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the e?cient allocation under private monitoring, without money. Here, we ?ll this gap by o?ering a general proof, as well as by characterizing the e?cient non-monetary equilibrium. This technique can be extended to study games with simultaneous actions.

Keywords: Tacit coordination; Random matching; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 E4 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-ore
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https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/288/

Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation in indefinitely repeated helping games: Existence and characterization (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-28

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