Cooperation in indefinitely repeated helping games: Existence and characterization

Gabriele Camera and Alessandro Gioffré

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2022, vol. 200, issue C, 1344-1356

Abstract: Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on indefinitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the efficient allocation under private monitoring, without money. Here, we fill this gap by offering a general proof, as well as by characterizing the efficient non-monetary equilibrium. This technique can be extended to study games with simultaneous actions.

Keywords: Tacit coordination; Random matching; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 E4 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Cooperation in Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence and Characterization (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:1344-1356

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.11.014

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