A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information

Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battleelds. An agents vector of battleeld valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agents resource allocation to a given battleeld is strictly monotone in the agents valuation of that battleeld. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto Games; Private Information; Bayes-Nash Equilibrium; Information Rents; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ore
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information (2021)
Working Paper: A Class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-29

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