A Class of N-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Christian Ewerhart and Dan Kovenock

No 336, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In this paper, we study N-player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield. We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the case M ≤ N, full-support type distributions, and network games.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto games; private information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; generalized Dirichlet distributions; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11, Revised 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/176995/7/econwp336.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information (2021)
Working Paper: A Class of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games with Multidimensional Private Information (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:336

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