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Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give

John List, James Murphy, Michael Price and Alexander James

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We partnered with Alaska’s Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to implement a statewide natural field experiment with 540,000 Alaskans designed to explore whether targeted appeals emphasizing donor benefits through warm glow impact donations. Results highlight the relative import of appeals to self. Individuals who received such an appeal were 4.5 percent more likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, a message that instead appealed to recipient benefits had no effect on average donations relative to the control group. We also find evidence of long-run effects of warm glow appeals in the subsequent year.

Keywords: Fields Experiment; Experimental Economics; Charitable Giving; Philanthropy, Warm Glow; Nonprofits; Altruism; Alaska; Permanent Fund Dividend (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D64 D91 H41 L30 L38 M31 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ltv
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/291/

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give (2019) Downloads
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