Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an experiment

Gabriele Camera and Lukas Hohl ()
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Lukas Hohl: University of Basel

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by ran-dom assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group aÿliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases. This suggests that group e ects are less likely to emerge when players cannot easily observe and compare characteristics on which to base categorizations and behaviors.

Keywords: large groups; indefinitely repeated game; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/347/

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Journal Article: Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-10

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